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Abstract 
Benkler (‘Sharing Nicely’, Yale Law Journal, 2004, Vol. 114, pp. 273-358) has 
argued that ‘social sharing’ via Internet-based distributed computing is a new, so far 
under-appreciated modality of economic production. This paper presents results from 
an empirical study of SETI@home (the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence), 
which is the classic example of such a computing project. The aim is to explain 
SETI@home participation and its intensity in a cross-country setting. The data are for 
a sample of 172 developed and developing countries for the years 2002-2004. The 
results indicate that SETI@home participation and its intensity can be explained 
largely by the degree of ICT access (proxied by the International Telecommunication 
Union’s ‘Digital Access Index’), as well as GDP per capita and dummy variables for 
major country groups. Some other variables, such as the Human Development Index, 
perform less well. Although SETI@home is a global phenomenon, it is never-the-less 
mostly concentrated in rich countries. However, there are indications of a slowly 
narrowing global SETI@home digital divide.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The Internet, and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in general, 
are ‘general purpose technologies’ (GPTs), i.e. technologies that greatly affect most 
sectors of the economy, and that do so increasingly over time, spawning many 
additional innovations.1 One of these innovations is distributed computing and its 
associated technologies. For example, Foster (2002) sees the emergence of cheaper 
and more powerful computer networks (grids) as a new computing infrastructure and 
paradigm that is likely to transform the practice of science and engineering.2 Demand 
for and supply of distributed computing technologies are re-enforcing each other, 
propelling the development of highly computationally intensive knowledge 
production. 
 
However, the potential impacts of these technologies are even broader. Benkler 
(2004) has argued that the Internet has not only remarkably reduced the cost of 
sharing information, but that sharing via the Internet is also emerging for certain 
physical, rivalrous goods, and that this will increase in future, resulting in a new, as 
yet under-appreciated, mode of economic production, which he labels ‘social 
sharing’. This new mode of economic production takes place alongside market 
production and state-based production, sometimes substituting for, and sometimes 
complementing, these other modes. The physical, rivalrous and privately owned 
goods shared are mostly computing power and bandwidth (a non-information age 
example is car-pooling). They are widely distributed amongst individuals and they 
have large unused capacity.3 Moreover, the participating individuals are either only 
loosely connected or complete strangers, i.e. they can possess a low level of ‘social 
capital’, yet their sharing combines “to form large-scale and effective systems for 
provisioning goods, services, and resources“ (ibid., p. 276).4  
  
Undoubtedly, current developments in computing technology and computer science 
are greatly increasing the technological potential for social sharing via distributed 
computing over the Internet.  However, although the prevalence of social sharing as a 
form of production is sensitive to technological conditions, it is not solely determined 
by them. Benkler observes (ibid., p. 340): “It is important to emphasize that 
technology imposes threshold constraints on effective sharing, but it cannot 
unilaterally determine the level of sharing practiced in a society. At any given level of 
technically feasible sharing, societies may differ in their cultural practices and tastes.” 
Similarly, David (2004) has emphasized the importance and interplay of appropriate 
technical, social and legal conditions for realising a cyber-infrastructure for scientific 
                                                 
1 See Helpman (1998) for a discussion of GPTs.  
2 Joseph and Fellenstein (2004) argue that grid computing, as well as other distributed 
computing technologies, grew out of a more homogenous distributed computing discipline. 
They provide an overview of grid computing, its emerging sub-disciplines, and the many 
commercial and non-commercial grid-computing initiatives underway. See also the Grid-Café 
at CERN (<http://gridcafe.web.cern.ch/gridcafe/>), and Ian Foster’s website (<http://www-
fp.mcs.anl.gov/~foster/>).  
3 Benkler (2004, p. 276/277) highlights two features of such ‘shareable goods’: They are 
lumpy (i.e. they come in discrete packages like PCs), and they are of ‘mid-grained’ 
granularity (i.e. they are widely privately owned and systematically have slack capacity).    
4 For a delineation of ‘social sharing’ from the related and more common, but also narrower, 
economic concepts of reciprocity and gift exchange, see Benkler (2004).  
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collaboration, i.e. e-science. In important respects the non-technical elements are as 
critical as the technical ones, if not more so.   
 
This paper analyses the prime example of a voluntary non-commercial Internet-based 
distributed computing project, i.e. the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence 
(SETI)@home.5 It is a first attempt to explore the broad determinants of SETI@home 
participation and its intensity in a cross-country setting. By necessity, the approach 
taken is to use the current state-of-the-art composite variable for measuring Internet 
access across the largest number of countries possible, plus other variables that mostly 
account for the level of development. It is recognised that further research will have to 
focus on smaller groups of countries for which better data are available in order to 
disentangle the technical and non-technical factors determining social sharing.     
 
The SETI@home project and the SETI data used in this study are briefly discussed in 
section 2. Section 3 introduces the explanatory variables employed in the empirical 
model. Regression results are reported in Section 4. Next, a snapshot of the global 
SETI@home digital divide is provided. Section 6 contains concluding comments. An 
appendix provides information on the countries included in the data sample and on the 
definition of the country dummy variables used in the analysis.    
 
 
2. SETI@home – a worldwide phenomenon 
 
Through a mix of popular appeal, various incentives, good technology for the task at 
hand and the right economics, SETI@home has been able to attract participants from 
around the world.6 It enlists PCs and uses their spare capacity to analyse data from the 
Arecibo radio telescope for signs of extraterrestrial intelligence. Launched on 13 May 
1999, it became the most powerful special purpose super computer in the world for 
part of its existence. It now provides more than 1000 years of CPU time a day. The 
form of distributed computing utilised by SETI@home is usually, but not always, 
classified as peer-to-peer (P2P) computing, i.e. a particular form of distributed 
computing characterised by its decentralised nature.7  
 
According to Gray (2003) SETI@home ‘pays’ for using participants’ computing 
resources “by providing a screen saver, by appealing to people’s interest in finding 
extra-terrestrial intelligence, and by creating competition among teams that want to 
demonstrate the performance of their systems.” Moreover, its economics is right: The 
compute cost to network cost of SETI@home is 10,000 to 1, i.e. it is very cpu-
itensive (ibid.). Gray estimates that SETI@home performed a multi-billion dollar 
computation for a million dollars (the cost being made up of those for network 
bandwidth, voluntarily donated cpu time and electricity).  
 
                                                 
5 See <http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/>.
6 It should be noted that the designer of SETI has also gone commercial, hoping to sell access 
to the world’s idle computers, or to sell the software to link idle computers within an 
enterprise (Foster, 2000).  
7 For a survey of P2P computing, including SETI@home and other P2P applications, see 
Milojicic et al. (2002). They contrast it with ‘grid computing’ and define P2P computing as “a 
class of systems and applications that employ distributed resources to perform a critical 
function in a decentralized manner” (ibid., p. 1).   
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The official SETI@home website provides a number of statistics about the 
performance of SETI and its participants. These are updated frequently, but not 
always on a daily basis. I downloaded the ‘country statistics’ reported for December 
10th, 2002, December 11th, 2003 and December 13th, 2004.8 The period covered in the 
analysis is one during which the number of countries connected to the Internet has 
been virtually constant. While in 1990 only 20 countries were connected, that 
increased to 115 in 1995 and surpassed the 200 mark in 2000 (ITU, 2003, Figure 1.1, 
p. 5). Only since the turn of the millennium has the Internet spread to virtually every 
corner of the globe. December 2004 SETI country statistics were available for 226 
countries, i.e. SETI@home was run basically everywhere in the world, the only 
notable exceptions being Mauritius, Vatican City and Palestine. By December 2004, 
there had been more than five million SETI@home users who had contributed over 2 
million years of CPU time (1000 years during the last day alone) (see Table 1).  
75.4% of users were located at home, 19.4% at work, 4.1% at school, and 1.1% 
elsewhere.  
 
 
Table 1:  Total statistics at 06:44:11, 13 December 2004:  
 Total Last 24 Hours 
Users 5,282,992 1,471 
Results received 1,680,253,315 1,515,916 
Total CPU time 2,156,513.796 years 1,091.221 years 
Floating point operations 6.137173e+21 5.912072e+18 
(68.43 TeraFLOPs/sec)
Average CPU time per work unit 11 hr 14 min 34.7 sec 6 hr 18 min 20.9 sec 
 
 
I use two alternative dependent variables in the regression analysis: “SETI 
participants per capita” and “SETI results per capita”. Participants per capita data can 
be criticized for the same reason that ‘Number of Internet users per 100 inhabitants’ 
or ‘Internet host density’ has been criticised (Kirkman et al., 2002): They indicate the 
degree of participation, but not its intensity. It should also be noted that the ‘SETI 
results per capita’ variable is arguably an improvement over the often used Internet-
intensity variable ‘hours of use’ (e.g. ‘average hours of Internet access per day’), 
because the latter does not say anything about outcomes, i.e. quality of use. In the 
case of SETI@home, intensity of participation is measured by actual outcomes (the 
number of data units processed). 
 
 
3. Variables that might explain SETI@home participation and its intensity 
 
Previous empirical studies of Internet and ICT diffusion and use report a host of 
(sometimes contradictory) findings with regard to explanatory variables (see, e.g., 
Kiiski and Pohjola, 2002, Chinn and Fairlie, 2004, Caselli and Coleman II, 2001, 
Pohjola, 2003). The relative importance of variables like GDP per capita (‘gdp’), 
Internet & telecommunication infrastructure and access costs, demographic and 
                                                 
8 They cover countries and some territories. Where appropriate, in the following, the term ‘countries’ 
covers both. The type of country statistics used in this paper seems to have become unavailable since a 
SETI@home software upgrade in early 2006.    
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institutional factors (e.g. quality of regulation) and human capital (e.g. educational 
attainment), tends to vary between studies. This is not surprising, given differences in 
country coverage and time periods, as well as differences in modelling approaches.    
 
The approach taken in this study is somewhat different from that followed in the 
existing literature. I explore the explanatory power of only a few key variables likely 
to capture the main determinants of SETI@home participation and its intensity in 
order to include the largest number of countries possible. These variables are, firstly, 
the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU)’s Digital Access Index (DAI), 
which is the current state-of-the-art composite variable to measure Internet access 
across countries, and, secondly, gdp. I also experimented with the use of the United 
Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) Human Development Index (HDI), 
another composite variable, and country group dummy variables.  
 
3.1  The Digital Access Index  
 
The DAI tries to measure “the overall ability of individuals in a country to access and 
use ICTs”, while also having as large a country coverage as possible and being 
transparent and intuitively understandable (ITU, 2003, p. 103/105). Introduced in the 
ITU’s 2003 World Telecommunication Development Report, it is promoted as 
providing the first truly global ICT ranking. Although several international 
organisations have developed composite indices that rank countries’ ICT capabilities, 
the ITU (ibid., p. 20) argues that none is completely satisfactory for measuring ICT 
access, which it regards as a most fundamental requisite for an inclusive information 
society.9 However, determining what to include in a composite index is a balancing 
act. This is nicely expressed in the ITU report (ibid., p. 6): “This report explains the 
different ways of measuring access to ICTs and offers a middle way between too 
much and too little, between relevance for the majority of countries or only for a 
minority, between what is achievable within existing constraints and what would 
require significantly increased resources.” In short, the design of such an index is 
always open to criticism.   
 
The DAI uses eight indicators to capture (a) infrastructure (fixed telephone and 
mobile telephone subscribers), (b) affordability (internet access price), (c) knowledge 
(adult literacy, school enrolment), (d) quality (broadband subscribers, international 
internet bandwidth) and (e) actual usage of ICTs (internet users)(see Table 2). It is 
calculated as follows: (1) Each indicator is divided by its goalpost, i.e. the maximum 
value established for it. This normalizes all indicators to take values between 0 and 1. 
(2) The resulting values are multiplied by their weight and added to obtain a category 
index. (3) The overall DAI is obtained by multiplying each of the five category 
indices by 0.2 and adding them up. This equal weighting scheme is defended as the 
most transparent weighting method. Moreover, the robustness of the weighting was 
tested by changing the percentages accounted for by the five category indices (but still 
                                                 
9 The non-exhaustive list of other composite indices includes (see ITU, 2003, pp. 100-103): 
The World Economic Forum’s “Network Readiness Index”, the International Data 
Corporation’s “Information Society Index”, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s “e-readiness 
ranking”, Mosaic Group’s measures of the state of Internet diffusion (they are not reported as 
a composite index, but others have used them to develop one), Orbicom’s “Infostate index”, 
the UNDP’s “Technology Achievement Index”, and the United Nation Conference for Trade 
and Development’s “ICT Diffusion Index” and their other related indices. 
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keeping the various percentages the same across countries). Correlation tests indicated 
that all the different weighting methods are statistically identical in terms of the 
overall rankings of the DAI (ITU, 2003, p. 110).10  
 
 
Table 2: Components of the Digtal Access Index (DAI), 2002 
Indicator Goal-
post 
Sub-Components (in italics) and their 
composition 
Fixed telephone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants1
60 
Mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants 100 
Each has a one half weight for 
infrastructure, which proxies overall 
ICT network development. 
Adult literacy2 100 
Overall school enrolment (primary, 
secondary and tertiary)2
100 
Literacy has a two-third weight and 
enrolment a one-third weight for 
knowledge, which affects a country’s 
ability to use new technologies. 
Internet access price (20 hours per 
month) as percent of monthly per capita 
income3 
1 This is subtracted from 1 to form an 
indicator that proxies  affordability of 
Internet access. (1=free Internet) 
Broadband subscribers per 100 
inhabitants4
30 
International Internet bandwidth per 
capita 
10’000
Each has a one half weight for quality of 
access to ICTs. 
Internet users per 100 inhabitants 85 This indicator proxies Internet usage. 
 
Notes: 1. Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) plus Integrated Services Digital 
Network (ISDN) subscribers. 2. Obtained from the UNDP’s Human Development 
Index. 3. Cheapest dial-up or broadband plan averaged over 20 hours of peak and 20 
hours of off-peak usage. Annual average exchange rates from the IMF are used to 
convert the Internet tariffs into US dollars. GNI per capita data are from the World 
Bank. 4. Including Digtal Subcriber Line (DSL), cable modem and other technologies 
faster than 128 kbit/s in at least one direction.  
Source: ITU (2003, Table 5.1, p. 106, Table 5.2, p. 108). 
 
 
I hypothesise that DAI is a positive and statistically significant determinant of 
SETI@home participation and its intensity. Should this prove correct, it would 
suggest that on average, the level of SETI participation and its intensity matches ICT 
accessibility.  
 
However, the use of a composite index in regression analysis is controversial. A 
composite index is only as good as its subindices and the way they are aggregated. 
The ITU (2003, p. 113-116) expresses the hope that the existence of the DAI will 
stimulate improvements in some of the underlying data that are currently of uncertain 
quality (e.g. for about half the countries the data on the number of Internet users are 
not based on survey data, and the school enrolment variable is not quality-adjusted). 
Moreover, the weights for the subindices are assumed to be the same across countries, 
which might not be appropriate across the large sample of countries used in this study. 
The ITU (ibid., p. 99) partially acknowledges this by qualifying the statement that one 
                                                 
10 For a more detailed discussion of definitional and methodological issues of the DAI see 
chapter 5 in ITU (2003). 
 6
of the main benefits of the DAI is its inter-country comparability: comparisons are 
most valuable for similar countries and for individual countries over time. This has to 
be kept in mind when interpreting the empirical results presented in sections 4&5 
below.11  
 
3.2  GDP per capita 
 
This variable has traditionally been used as a proxy for the standard of living in a 
country. Numerous studies exploring the determinants of Internet & ICT diffusion, 
use and the digital divide have included it as a key explanatory variable and found it 
positive and statistically significant. Moreover, it can arguably be regarded as a proxy 
for all the other variables positively correlated with gdp that are not included amongst 
the explanatory variables (Caselli and Coleman II, 2001). The gdp data in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) adjusted US $ used in this study were taken from UNDP (2004, 
pp. 139-141). They have been transformed into $ 000’s.    
 
3.3  The Human Development Index 
 
The HDI is a composite index that “focuses on three measurable dimensions of 
human development: living a long and healthy life, being educated and having a 
decent standard of living…it combines measures of life expectancy, school enrolment, 
literary, and income…” (UNDP, 2004, p. 128). It is calculated as the simple average 
of three dimension sub-indices (the life expectancy index, the education index, and 
the gdp index). These are based on data for life expectancy at birth, the adult literacy 
rate, the (combined) gross (primary, secondary and tertiary) enrolment ratio, and gdp. 
To calculate the dimension sub-indices, maximum and minimum values for the 
underlying data are first chosen. This enables the dimension sub-indices to be 
expressed as values between 0 and 1. Note that the education index is a weighted 
average of the adult literary and the gross enrolment ratio, using the same weights as 
in the DAI.12   
 
Although a consensus is emerging that the HDI is the preferred measure of 
development (Meier and Rauch, 2005, p. 2), it is recognised that it is still not 
comprehensive enough. The view adopted in this study, and probably in most of the 
literature, is that the HDI captures important dimensions of human development 
neglected by the level of income. It is best included in regressions as an explanatory 
variable alongside gdp and other variables. However, whether this improves the 
explanatory power of a regression is an empirical question. As in the case of DAI and 
gdp, I expect a positive relationship between human development and SETI@home 
participation and its intensity. 
 
The same critical issues concerning composite indices that were mentioned in the 
discussion of DAI arise with respect to HDI.  Comparing the composition of the two 
composite indices, there is a minor overlap with regard to adult literacy and school 
                                                 
11 An exploration of issues concerning the validity of various related composite indices is 
beyond the scope of this paper. For some critical comments on composite indices see, for 
example, Grigorovici et al. (2002), Engelbrecht (2003), Giacomello and Picci (2003). 
12 For further details, see Technical Note 1, UNDP (2004, pp. 258/9). 
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enrolment rate (they are much more important in the HDI, accounting for half of the 
index, compared to 20% of the DAI).  
 
3.4  Country group dummy variables 
 
I include broad country group dummy variables amongst the explanatory variables, in 
particular “developed&advanced” countries versus “the rest”. The former are listed in 
ITU (2003, p. xi) and comprise 27 out of the 172 countries in the data set (see 
appendix). I further experimented with the use of six regional dummy variables 
similar to those employed by Caselli and Coleman II (2001). Their definitions are also 
provided in the appendix. Although only an analysis using time-series data can 
properly account for country-specific effects, the broad country group dummy 
variables and regional dummy variables account for some major inter-country 
differences that need to be taken into account in order to obtain reliable statistical 
estimates.  
 
 
4. Regression results  
 
For 54 countries participating in SETI@home (about 24% of the total) there were no 
matching data on DAI, HDI, and gdp. These countries have been deleted from the 
analysis, leaving 172. The main regressions are reported in Table 3. They include the 
dependent variables in, alternatively, 2004 levels as well as in 2002-2004 changes and 
DAI, gdp (both for 2002) as well as the developed&advanced country group dummy 
variable. Five countries (Yemen, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Ethiopia) had fewer 
participants per capita in December 2004 then in December 2002, i.e. the change in 
participants per capita in logs could not be used. These observations were therefore 
deleted from the data used in regression (4), resulting in a slightly smaller sample 
size. 
    
All estimates reported in Table 3 are highly statistically significant. In regressions (1), 
(2), and (4), the estimates for DAI and gdp are their elasticities. In regression (3), the 
elasticities for DAI and gdp evaluated at the sample means are, respectively, 0.767 
and 1.127. The elasticities are all quite similar. Increasing DAI and gdp by 1% 
increases the dependent variables by a similar percentage. The explanatory power of 
the regressions is high as judged by the adjusted R2 values. It seems to make relatively 
little difference whether SETI participants per capita or SETI results per capita is used 
as dependent variable.   
 
All regressions, i.e. not just regression (3), were also estimated by Box Cox 
transformation which indicated that the double log form is greatly preferred to the 
linear form (in case of the latter, the residuals are highly non-normal). Normality of 
residuals further required the use of gdp and of the developed&advanced country 
group dummy variable. Multiple regional dummy variables did not improve the 
regressions.   
 
HDI (for 2002) performed less well than DAI. When it was used instead of DAI as an 
explanatory variable alongside gdp, its coefficient estimate was either positive but not 
statistically significant, or positive and statistically significant but with highly non-
normal residuals. Using both DAI and HDI in the same regression produced  
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Table 3: Regression results  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Results 
per capita 
2004 
Participants  
per capita 
2004 
Change in 
results per 
capita, 2002-
2004 
Change in 
participants per 
capita, 2002-2004 
Indep. Variables:     
DAI 2002 0.945b 
(2.25) 
1.065a 
(3.54) 
0.745b 
(2.17) 
0.892a 
(3.02) 
gdp 2002 1.144a 
(4.82) 
1.031a 
(5.36) 
0.938a 
(4.96) 
0.985a 
(5.43) 
Dev&adv 
dummy 
1.121a 
(3.52) 
0.769a 
(3.09) 
1.013a 
(2.98) 
0.689a 
(2.91) 
Intercept -4.383a 
(-5.59) 
-9.348a 
(-15.86) 
-4.457a 
(-6.94) 
-10.668a 
(-18.65) 
     
Adj. R2 0.70 0.77 0.69 0.73 
DW 1.76 1.57 1.73 1.73 
JB  1.28 1.08 5.68 0.32 
No. of obs. 172 172 172 167 
λ   0.05  
a Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level (one-sided test). 
b Denotes statistical significance at the 2.5% level (one-sided test). 
All regressions were estimated by Ordinary Least Squares with White’s heteroskedasticity 
correction and, except for regression (3), were estimated in double-log form. t-ratios are 
given in brackets. DW is the Durbin-Watson d test for auto-correlation. The null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation is accepted at the 1% level of significance for all regressions except 
regression (2), for which it is rejected (dL=1.6). JB is the Jarque-Bera test for normality of 
residuals. The critical value at the 1% level of significance is χ2(2) = 9.21. λ indicates the 
exponent in the (extended) Box-Cox regression that was used to transform both the 
dependent variable and explanatory variables (except the dummy variables).   
 
 
statistically insignificant and negative coefficient estimates for the latter, which is not 
surprising given the very high correlation between the two (0.95). The regression 
estimates including HDI have therefore not been reported.  
 
To sum up, the regression results indicate that SETI@home participation and its 
intensity are not ‘idiosyncratic’, i.e. they are indeed largely explained by DAI and 
gdp. This seems to be a promising result for all those that support SETI@home and 
similar projects, and for those supporting social sharing via Internet-based distributed 
computing in general. However, one should be cautious in using these findings to 
predict the future growth of such activities. This would require a detailed analysis of 
the socio-institutional conditions affecting the further development of the underlying 
network infrastructures and incentives of participants. 
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5. SETI@home and the global digital divide   
 
There is a large literature on the digital divide between (and within) rich and poor 
countries (see, e.g., Chinn and Fairlie, 2004, and the survey by Hargittai, 2003). A 
general definition of the term with regard to the Internet is ‘inequality in access and 
use of the medium’ (ibid., p. 824).13  The ITU (2003, Figure 1.3, p. 3) reports that in 
2003 there were 43.7 Internet users per 100 inhabitants in high income countries, 
compared to 1.3 in the low income countries (i.e. in the lowest of five groups of 
countries ranked by income levels). However, some authors, for example Fink and 
Kenny (2003) and Dutta et al. (2004, p. 18/19), are challenging the view that the 
digital divide is widening. Instead, there seems to be some evidence of digital 
convergence.14  
 
Table 4 provides a snapshot of the digital divide in terms of the SETI@home data on 
number of total users, total results received, and population for the groups of 
developed&advanced countries versus ‘the rest’. Although SETI@home is a world-
wide phenomenon, it is largely concentrated in the developed&advanced countries. 
By December 2004 the former, accounting for just over 15% of the population of the 
172 countries in the sample, had contributed over 90% of all results. However, the 
December 2002 to December 2004 growth rates for users and results have been faster 
in ‘the rest’. The picture that emerges is that of a slowly narrowing global 
SETI@home digital divide. Of course, the time period covered is very short. It will be 
interesting to see whether the observed trend continues in future.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The divide can be defined in many dimensions, for example in terms of all ICTs, or, like in 
this study, for a particular form of technology, or by geographic region, or by social group, 
etc. (Hargittai, 2003). In short, one should always be careful to specify what type of digital 
divide is being analysed.   
14 This is similar to recent findings in the literature on broader convergence and divergence 
issues (Neumayer, 2003, Kenny, 2005).   
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Table 4: Developed & Advanced Countries  
versus ‘the Rest’ (172 country sample) 
    
Table 4A:  
December 2004 totals Developed&advanced 
countries: 
The rest: % the rest: 
No. of total users: 4,511,609 604,821 11.8% 
No. of total results: 1,507,659,459 164,968,938 9.9% 
Total population:  900,395,111 4,975,626,881 84.7% 
  
December 2002 totals: Developed&advanced 
countries: 
The rest: % the rest: 
No. of total users: 3,559,136 425,122 10.7% 
No. of total results: 661,872,079 47,186,802 6.7% 
Total population: 899,335,782 4,975,979,881 84.7% 
    
Table 4B: Percentage increase Dec. 2002- Dec. 2004: 
 Developed&advanced 
countries 
The rest:  
No. of total users: 26.8% 42.3%  
No. of results: 127.8% 249.6%  
    
Table 4C:  Per capita and per user results: 
  
Developed&advanced 
countries: 
 
The rest: 
The rest as % 
of dev&adv 
countries: 
No. of total users per 
capita by Dec. 2004: 
 
0.00501 
 
0.00012 
 
2.43% 
No. of total users per 
capita by Dec. 2002: 
 
0.00396 
 
0.000085 
 
2.16% 
No. of total results per 
capita by Dec. 2004: 
 
1.67444 
 
0.03316 
 
1.98% 
No. of total results per 
capita by Dec. 2002: 
 
0.73596 
 
0.00948 
 
1.29% 
No. of total results per 
user by Dec. 2004: 
 
334.17 
 
272.76 
 
81.6% 
No. of total results per 
user by Dec. 2002: 
 
185.96 
 
111 
 
59.7% 
 
 
 
6. Concluding comments  
 
This paper has presented a first attempt at determining the major factors explaining 
SETI@home participation and its intensity. Variables measuring Internet access and 
standard of living explain a large part of the cross-country variation, as does the 
general divide between rich and poor countries captured by the dummy variable used 
in the regressions. There is a need for studies of other social sharing projects to 
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establish whether SETI@home is representative of social sharing in general, and for 
the use of more sophisticated models than that tested in this paper.15   
 
Suffice it to say that whether social sharing via the Internet will in future become a 
dominant mode of production alongside others is an interesting open question. On the 
one hand, the technical potential for social sharing seems great. So far, only a small 
fraction of the world’s PCs, which by one estimate totalled over 820 million in 2004 
(CIA, 2005), are participating in voluntary grid computing projects (also see Table 
4C). However, distributed computing and its associated technologies also provide 
opportunities for commercial applications. Should technological progress render 
widespread commercial grid computing feasible and profitable to the extent that many 
PC owners can participate in it, the willingness of the public to contribute to non-
commercial projects might be negatively affected. Moreover, should ‘computing on 
demand’ become reality, individuals would not have to own a PC with excess 
computing power usable for social sharing. In short, there are various business models 
potentially applicable to distributed computing that could affect the prevalence of 
social sharing. It remains to be seen whether commercial interests will prevail in 
future and reduce the extent of non-commercial sharing over the Internet.  
 
On the other hand, as pointed out by David (2004), apart from technological 
developments distributed computing and its associated technologies also crucially 
depend on supportive socio-institutional elements, like legal and administrative 
regimes, that might be difficult to establish. If at all, these softer elements were only 
partly captured by the variable DAI in this paper. Therefore, further research should 
focus on narrower and more homogenous groups of countries. That should make it 
possible to include more explanatory variables, and also to use more sophisticated 
modelling approaches (like simultaneous equation modelling), that would allow the 
disentangling of the various factors determining future trends. In particular, more 
detailed models are needed to address the important issue of how social sharing and 
its relationship with other forms of production might inform economic policy, and 
how these relationships and policies might differ for countries at different stages of 
economic development. This goes beyond the scope of this paper, but the stakes for 
economic progress are potentially very high.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 If it could be established that SETI@home participation is a representative network 
application, one might even be able to use it as an explanatory variable to predict network 
infrastructure in some countries, as suggested by one of the referees.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1:  List of countries* and definition of dummy variables:  
 
Countries (all included in 172 
observation data set): 
(a) 
Developed& 
Advanced 
Countries1
(b) 
Developing 
Countries2
(c) 
Regional  
Dummy 
Variables3
1) Iceland X  - 
2) Finland X  - 
3) Denmark X  - 
4) Canada X  - 
5) Netherlands X  - 
6) United States X  - 
7) Sweden X  - 
8) United Kingdom X  - 
9) New Zealand X  - 
10) Luxembourg X  - 
11) Australia X  - 
12) Germany X  - 
13) Norway X  - 
14) Austria X  - 
15) Switzerland X  - 
16) Estonia  X EEU 
17) Belgium X  - 
18) Antigua and Barbuda  X LAC 
19) Ireland X  - 
20) Slovenia  X EEU 
21) Saint Kitts and Nevis  X LAC 
22) Portugal X  - 
23) Czech Republic  X - 
24) France X  - 
25) Hungary  X - 
26) Spain X  - 
27) Croatia  X EEU 
28) Israel (X)  - 
29) Malta  X - 
30) Poland  X - 
31) Singapore (X)  EA 
32) Greece X  - 
33) Italy X  - 
34) Cyprus (X)  - 
35) Dominica  X LAC 
36) Japan X  - 
37) Grenada  X LAC 
38) Slovakia  X - 
39) Brunei Darussalam  X EA 
40) Lithuania  X EEU 
41) Uruguay  X LAC 
42) Latvia  X EEU 
43) Chile  X LAC 
44) Bahamas  X LAC 
45) Bulgaria  X EEU 
46) Barbados  X LAC 
47) Argentina  X LAC 
48) Belize  X LAC 
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49) Costa Rica  X LAC 
50) Cape Verde  (X) SSA 
51) United Arab Emirates  X ARW 
52) Seychelles  X SSA 
53) Saint Lucia  X LAC 
54) Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
 X EEU 
55) Bahrain  X ARW 
56) Republic of Korea (X)  - 
57) Saint Vincent and Grenadines  X LAC 
58) Romania  X EEU 
59) Panama  X LAC 
60) Malaysia  X EA 
61) Albania  X EEU 
62) Trinidad and Tobago  X LAC 
63) Mexico  X - 
64) Qatar  X ARW 
65) Venezuela  X LAC 
66) Kuwait  X ARW 
67) Brazil  X LAC 
68) Sao Tome and Principe  (X) SSA 
69) Vanuatu  (X) ROA 
70) Comoros  (X) SSA 
71) Maldives  (X) ROA 
72) South Africa  X SSA 
73) Samoa  (X) ROA 
74) Bosnia and Herzegovina  X EEU 
75) Colombia  X LAC 
76) Turkey  X - 
77) Swaziland  X SSA 
78) Guyana  X LAC 
79) Dominican Republic  X LAC 
80) Lebanon  X ARW 
81) Fiji  X ROA 
82) Jamaica  X LAC 
83) Djibouti  (X) SSA 
84) Namibia  X SSA 
85) Russian Federation  X EEU 
86) Paraguay  X LAC 
87) Suriname  X LAC 
88) Ecuador  X LAC 
89) Congo  X SSA 
90) El Salvador  X LAC 
91) Jordan  X ARW 
92) Oman  X ARW 
93) Gabon  X SSA 
94) Belarus  X EEU 
95) Bolivia  X LAC 
96) Honduras  X LAC 
97) Peru  X LAC 
98) Botswana  X SSA 
99) Equatorial Guinea  (X) SSA 
100) Armenia  X ROA 
101) Guatemala  X LAC 
102) Thailand  X EA 
103) Solomon Islands  (X) ROA 
104) Gambia  (X) SSA 
105) Georgia  X ROA 
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106) Ukraine  X EEU 
107) Nicaragua  X LAC 
108) Republic of Moldova  X EEU 
109) Philippines  X EA 
110) Angola  (X) SSA 
111) Algeria  X ARW 
112) Guinea  (X) SSA 
113) Azerbaijan  X ROA 
114) Zimbabwe  X SSA 
115) China  X ROA 
116) Kazakstan  X ROA 
117) Bhutan  (X) ROA 
118) Mongolia  X ROA 
119) Tunisia  X ARW 
120) Saudi Arabia  X ARW 
121) Guinea-Bissau  (X) SSA 
122) Kyrgyzstan  X ROA 
123) Sri Lanka  X ROA 
124) Iran  X ARW 
125) Cuba  X LAC 
126) Central African Republic  (X) SSA 
127) Mauritania  (X) SSA 
128) Egypt  X ARW 
129) Cambodia  (X) ROA 
130) Haiti  (X) LAC 
131) Pakistan  X ROA 
132) Morocco  X ARW 
133) Lesotho  (X) SSA 
134) India  X ROA 
135) Burkina Faso  (X) SSA 
136) Papua New Guinea  X ROA 
137) Ghana  X SSA 
138) Eritrea  (X) SSA 
139) Zambia  (X) SSA 
140) Nepal  (X) ROA 
141) Turkmenistan  X ROA 
142) Cameroon  X SSA 
143) Tajikistan  X ROA 
144) Malawi  (X) SSA 
145) Libya  X ARW 
146) Burundi  (X) SSA 
147) Chad  (X) SSA 
148) Benin  (X) SSA 
149) Indonesia  X EA 
150) Togo  (X) SSA 
151) Sierra Leone  (X) SSA 
152) Laos  (X) ROA 
153) Senegal  (X) SSA 
154) Viet Nam  X ROA 
155) Kenya  X SSA 
156) United Rep. of Tanzania  (X) SSA 
157) Cote d'Ivoire  X SSA 
158) Syrian Arab Republic  X ARW 
159) Uzbekistan  X ROA 
160) Yemen  (X) ARW 
161) Madagascar  (X) SSA 
162) Rwanda  (X) SSA 
163) Mozambique  (X) SSA 
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164) Uganda  (X) SSA 
165) Niger  (X) SSA 
166) Bangladesh  (X) ROA 
167) Mali  (X) SSA 
168) Sudan  (X) SSA 
169) Myanmar  (X) ROA 
170) Dem. Republic of the Congo  (X) SSA 
171) Nigeria  X SSA 
172) Ethiopia  (X) SSA 
 
Notes:  
* The 54 countries deleted from the 226 countries for which SETI@home data were available are:  
Afghanistan, American Samoa, Andorra, Anquilla, Antarctica, Aruba, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Cook Islands, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, East Timor, 
Faeroe Islands, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, French Polynesia, Gaza Strip, Gibraltar, Greenland, 
Guadeloupe, Guam, Iraq,  Isle of Man, Kiribati, Liberia, Lichtenstein, Macau, Marshall Islands, 
Martinique, Micronesia, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Niue, 
Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Pitcairn Islands, Puerto Rico, Reunion, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, 
San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Somalia, Taiwan, Tokelau,  Tonga, Turks and Caicos Islands, 
Tuvalu, United States Virgin Islands, Wallis and Futuna Islands, Western Sahara. 
1 Developed and advanced countries (advanced countries in brackets), 172 country data set. These 
countries are listed in ITU (2003, p. xi). 
2 ‘The Rest’: Developing countries (least developed countries in brackets), 172 country data set.  
3 Regional dummy variables: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Arab 
World (ARW), East Asia (EA), Rest of Asia and Pacific (ROA), Eastern Europe (EEU). The remaining 
countries belong mostly to the OECD. These dummy variables are similar to those used in Caselli and 
Coleman II (2001). 
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